Volume 90

Issue 2

Article 7

January 1988

Confrontation in the Balance: The Protection of Child Witnesses in
West Virginia
Tamara J. DeFazio
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Evidence Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tamara J. DeFazio, Confrontation in the Balance: The Protection of Child Witnesses in West Virginia, 90
W. Va. L. Rev. (1988).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/7

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

DeFazio: Confrontation in the Balance: The Protection of Child Witnesses i

CONFRONTATION IN THE BALANCE:
THE PROTECTION OF CHILD WITNESSES
IN WEST VIRGINIA
I.

INTRODUCTION

In light of the heightened public awareness of the problems
faced in prosecuting sexual abuse cases where a child is a victim
or a witness,' both courts 2 and legislatures3 alike have recognized
the need for flexibility when the admissibility of an extra-judicial
statement made by a child is at issue. In an effort to accommodate
this need, it has been proposed that West Virginia Rule of Evidence
(WVRE) 8044 be amended to included an exception by which the
1. Moss, Are the Children Lying?, 73 A.B.A. J. 59 (1987).
2. See Moll v. State, 351 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Messamore, 2 Haw.
App. 643, 639 P.2d 413 (1982); Johnson v. United States, 364 A.2d 1198 (D.C. 1976); United States
v. Ashe, 478 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1973); contra Herbert v. Superior Ct., 117 Cal. App. 3d 661,
172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981).
3. See Asiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1984 & Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3411(3) (1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10 (1983 & Supp. 1987); IND. CODE § 35-37-4 to
-6 (1984 & Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (dd) (1983); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (1984 &
Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1983 &
Supp. 1987); WAsH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
4. W. VA. R. EVlD. 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable.
(a) Definition of Unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which
the declarant(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning
the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite
an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing
physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to
procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4),
his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement
for the purpose of preventing.the witness from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or
a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same
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extra-judicial statements of a child victim or witness may be admitted when the child declarant is unavailable to testify.'

or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action
or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
(2) Statement under Belief of Impending Death. In a prosecution for homicide or in a
civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was
imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death.
(3) Statement against Interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to
civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable
man [person] in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.
A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused
is not admissable [admissible] unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness
of the statement.
(4) Statement of Personal or Family History. (A) A statement concerning the declarant's
own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage,
ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history, even though declarant had no means
of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the other by blood,
adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the other's family as to be likely to
have accurate information concerning the matter declared.
(5) Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines
that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity
to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the
name and address of the declarant.
5. The text of the proposed amendments to W. VA. R. EvM. 804 is as follows:
Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions, Declarant Unavailable.
(a)(6) Is a child under the age of twelve who made a hearsay statement describing an act
of sexual conduct or physical violence performed by or with another on or with that child or any
other person;
(a)(7) Is a child between the ages of twelve and sixteen who made a hearsay statement
describing an act of sexual conduct or physical violence performed by or with another on or with
that child or any other person for whom the court finds there is a substantial likelihood that the
child will suffer severe emotional or psychological distress if required to testify in open court.
(b)(6) Statement of child victims or witnesses.
A hearsay statement describing an act of sexual conduct or physical violence performed
by or with another on or with that child or any other person is not excluded by the hearsay rule
if the court determines that (a) the statement was made prior to the preparation of any criminal
charge or legal proceeding; (b) the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (c) the statement was not made in response to
questioning calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement or is clearly shown to be
the child's statement and not the product of improper suggestion; (d) the person who heard or
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In an attempt to forecast the effectiveness of the above rule,
this article will examine the impact that such a rule would have

on present West Virginia law and the constitutional soundness of
the rule itself. Although it will become necessary to view the rule

against a backdrop of case law from other jurisdictions, a conscious
effort will be made where similar rules have been adopted to ac-

commodate the needs of the West Virginia practitioner.
II.

ADMISSIBILITY OF CHILD HEARSAY STATEMENTS UNDER

PRESENT WEST VIRGINIA LAW

The general rule under which child hearsay statements are currently being admitted is West Virginia Rule of Evidence (WVRE)
803(2).6 Under this excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule,
"a statement relating to a startling event or condition ' 7 may be
admitted into evidence as long as the statement was "made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event

took the hearsay statement of the child is present in court and is available for examination or
cross-examination by any party; (e) the proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse
party his intention to offer the statement and the copy of the statement sufficiently in advance of
the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement; and (f) except for the death of the child, the child is available for examination or crossexamination by the parties in such a manner as the court may direct.
Upon request, the court will direct whether examination by closed circuit television or
testimony videotaped outside the courtroom for showing in the courtroom before the court and
the finder of fact in the proceeding is to be used. During the use of two-way closed circuit television
or the videotaping of the testimony, only the judge, the attorneys for the parties, the parties,
persons necessary to operate the equipment and any persons the court finds would contribute to
the welfare and well-being of the child may be present. If the court finds that placing the child
and one or more of the parties in the same room during the testimony of the child would present
a substantial risk of trauma to the child which would substantially impair the ability of the child
to testify, the court may order that the defendant be situated in such a way that, except as may
be necessary for purposes of identification, the child cannot hear or see the defendant.
Although the proposed amendments to the West Virginia Rules of Evidence include a
minor change in the language of W. VA. R. Evm. 801, namely the addition of the words "or
electronic assertion" at the end of the rule, these words were added merely to ensure that courts
would apply hearsay analysis to electronically recorded statements. The merits of this amendment
will not be addressed in this article.
6. W. VA. R. EviD. 803(2) provides that:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available
as a witness:
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
7. Id.
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or condition." '8 It is important to note that this exception to the
hearsay rule is applicable regardless of whether or not the declarant
is available as a witness.9
A. The History and Present Application of the Excited
Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule
The excited utterance exception' ° to. the hearsay rule developed
out of the verbal act rule." "As originally conceived, the verbal
act rule was limited to declarations made during the transaction
and did not include any declarations which were made after the
act.' 2 Thus, in determining whether or not a statement could be
admitted into evidence under the verbal act rule, the West Virginia
courts looked primarily to see if the statement had been made contemporaneously with the act itself. 3 Gradually, however, West Virginia courts departed "from the strict requirement of
contemporaneity in favor of a less technical approach based more
upon the spontaneity of the utterance than its timing."1 4 In Starcher
v. South Penn Oil Co.,15 the movement away from the strict requirement of contemporaneity was solidified as the court held that
a statement made after the transaction itself was admissible. 16 Once
the distinction between the verbal act rule and the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule became firmly rooted, the court felt
the need to establish guidelines by which the spontaneity of a hearsay statement could be evaluated. 7 The need was intensified by the
"confusion generated by the intermingling of the generic term 'res
gestae' and the specific term 'spontaneous utterance .... , ,,18

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. West Virginia courts often use the term res gestae and spontaneous exclamation interchangeably when referring to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. See F. CLECKLEY,
HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE FOR WEST VIRGINiA TR I. LAWYERS, § 8.7(B) (2d ed. 1986).
11. State v. Young, 166 W. Va. 309, 315, 273 S.E.2d 592, 597 (1980).
12. Id. at 315, 273 S.E.2d at 597 (citing Beckwith v. Mollohan, 2 W. Va. 477 (1868)).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 315-16, 273 S.E.2d at 597.
15. Starcher v. South Penn Oil Co., 81 W. Va. 587, 95 S.E. 28 (1918).
16. Young, 166 W. Va. at 316, 273 S.E.2d at 598.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 599, 273 S.E.2d at 318; see also F. CLECKLEY,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/7
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Consequently, in Ward v. Raleigh County Park Bd.,19 the West

Virginia Supreme Court set forth a six factor test by which the
courts could determine the admissibility of an alleged excited utterance. 20 The factors included in the Ward test are as follows:
(1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must
explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it must be a
natural declaration or statement growing out of the event, and not a mere narrative of a past completed affair; (3) it must be a statement of fact, and not
the mere expression of an opinion; (4) it must be a spontaneous or instinctive
utterance of thought, dominated or evoked by the transaction or occurrence
itself, and not the product of premeditation, reflection or design; (5) while the
declaration or statement need not be coincident or contemporaneous with the
occurrence of the event, it must be made at such time and under such circumstances as will exclude the presumption that it is the result of deliberation; and
(6) it must appear that the declaration or statement was made by one who either
participated in the transaction or witnessed the act or fact concerning which
2
the declaration or statement was made. '

Although the West Virginia Supreme Court has not had occasion to conduct a thorough analysis of the applicability of the

above factors in the context of a child sexual abuse proceeding, it
did address the issue summarily in State v. Swiger.22 In Swiger, a
five-year-old girl was determined to have been sexually assaulted

after she was found "lying seriously injured ' 23 on the floor. The
child had also sustained injuries to her neck resulting from choking
or strangulation. 24 While the doctor examined her at the hospital,
he asked her what had happened. 2 The child "stated that 'Bobby'

[the accused] had attacked her.''26 On appeal, the appellant contended that the trial court erred in admitting the child's statement
under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. 27 Although not
19. Ward v. Raleigh County Park Bd., 143 W. Va. 931, 105 S.E.2d 881 (1958).
20. Id. at 937, 105 S.E.2d at 885.
21. Id.
22. State v. Swiger, 336 S.E.2d 541 (V. Va. 1985). The issue in Swiger was whether or not
the accused was competent to stand trial for first degree sexual assault. In holding that the accused
was incompetent to stand trial, the West Virginia Supreme Court addressed the accused's objection
to the admissibility of the five-year-old victim's statement to her doctor in footnote 8 of the opinion.
See infra note 33.
23. Swiger, 336 S.E.2d at 544.
24. Id. at 549 n.8.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
Disseminated
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essential to the holding in the case, 28 the supreme court took care
to indicate that the trial court had not so erred, emphasizing that
"at the time the statement to Dr. Montgomery was made,... [the

child] was still under the influence of the alleged sexual assault and
choking incident." 29 The court then pointed out that, '[s]tatements
by a participant in a transaction are admissible as part of the res
gestae, if spontaneous and made while under the influence of the
transaction itself.' 30 Lastly, the court reiterated the six factor test
31
set forth in Ward.
Thus, the court did not explicitly apply the six factor test to
the facts of Swiger. However, given the conclusions 32 reached by
the court regarding the admissibility of the statement, it can be
logically inferred that the test was implicitly relied upon. In addition to emphasizing that the child was still under the influence
of the alleged assault at the time the statement was made, 33 the
court also indicated that factors four and five weigh most heavily
in its analysis. Thus, it logically follows that if a child hearsay
statement possesses significant indicia of spontaneity, it is likely
that such a statement will be admitted, even if the other four factors are satisfied by a modicum of evidence.
B. The Impact of the Proposed Child Hearsay Exception on
Present West Virginia Law
One of the principle differences between the Excited Utterance
exception to the hearsay rule and the proposed Child's Exception
is that the latter requires the declarant to be unavailable as a condition precedent for its application.3 4 Given the fact that the issue
28. Id.
29. See supra note 22.
30. Swiger, 336 S.E.2d at 549 n.8 (quoting State v. Coram, 116 W. Va. 492, 182 S.E. 83
(1935) (statements made by a five-year-old to her mother twenty minutes after alleged attempted
rape held admissible under res gestae exception to the hearsay rule)).
31. Id. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also State v. Golden, 336 S.E.2d 198 (W. Va. 1985); State v. Ray, 298 S.E.2d
921 (,V. Va. 1982); State v. Withrow, 142 W. Va. 522, 96 S.E.2d 913 (1957); Coram, 116 W. Va.
492, 182 S.E. 83.

34. See W. VA. R. Evm. 803(2) & 804.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/7
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of unavailability and the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation

are inextricably intertwined,35 both will be discussed together in the
section of this article dealing with the constitutionality of the proposed rule. Assuming arguendo that the condition precedent of

unavailability has been satisfied, this article will now focus on the
requirements set forth in proposed WVRE 804(b)(6).

Initially, the proposed rule requires that the hearsay statement
offered into evidence be one "describing an act of sexual conduct
or physical violence performed by or with another on or with that

child or any other person." 3 6 Secondly, the rule requires that the
court make six specific determinations before the statement can be
37
admitted into evidence.
The first determination which must be made by the court is that

"the statement was made prior to the preparation of any criminal
charge or legal proceeding." 3 8 Although no case law involving this

determination has been located, it can be logically inferred that
such a determination would be closely related to the second de-

termination to be made by the court-that "the time, content and
circumstances of the statement provide sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness.

' 39

Thus, the existence of this fact contributes sig-

nificantly toward establishing the trustworthiness of the statement. 40
Secondly, the court must determine that "the time, content and

circumstances of the statement provide sufficient circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness.

' 41

The gist of this requirement is

firmly rooted in present West Virginia law, 42 perhaps best exem35. See generally Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
36. See supra note 5.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Interview with Franklin D. Cleckley, Original Reporter of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence and Member of the Ad-hoc Committee which drafted the Proposed Child Hearsay Exception (Aug. 28, 1987).
41. See supra note 5.
42. See Golden, 336 S.E.2d 198; Ray, 298 S.E.2d 921; State v. Mahramus, 157 W. Va. 175,
200 S.E.2d 357 (1973); Withrow, 142 W. Va. 522, 96 S.E.2d 913; Coram, 116 W. Va. 492, 182
S.E. 83. See also State v. Rodriguez, 8 Kan. App. 2d 353, 657 P.2d 79 (1983) (statements made
by child four hours after incident held admissible under hearsay exception).
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plified by State v. Ray. 43 Returning home five to ten minutes after

being released from the car where the alleged assault took place,
the alleged victim in Ray told her stepmother of the assault.44 The
victim's appearance described as "being emotionally distraught,
shaking all over with tears in her eyes." ' 4 Holding the victim's
hearsay statement to her stepmother admissible as a spontaneous
declaration under the six factor test of Ward,46 the court reasoned
that "[t]he testimony indicate[s] that the victim was pale and shaking. She was obviously under the influence of the event and we
believe that the statement was made at a time and under circumstances which exclude the view that it was made as a result of
deliberation." 47 Although the alleged victim in Ray was seventeen
years old, there is authority which indicates that where a young
child is involved, evidence of a less weighty character may be held
8
to provide sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
The third determination which must be made by the court is
that "the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement or is clearly
shown to be the child's statement and not the product of improper
suggestion. ' 49 There is no case directly on point with the requirement. However, in State v. Young, 0 the West Virginia Supreme
Court dealt peripherally with the issue of whether or not a hearsay
statement made in response to questions should have been admitted
into evidence 5' as an excited utterance. In Young, a woman ran
into a store exclaiming that she had been shot, whereupon the store
owner called the authorities and asked the victim her name and

43. Ray, 298 S.E.2d 921.

44. Id. at 923.
45. Id.
46. See Ward, 143 W. Va. 931, 105 S.E.2d 881.
47. Ray, 298 S.E.2d at 924. See also Withrow, 142 W. Va. at 546, 96 S.E.2d at 926.
48. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981); Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1253 (1984); State v.
Ritchey, 107 Ariz. 552, 490 P.2d 558 (1971); State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa 1983) (McGiverin,

J., dissenting).
49. See supra note 5.
50. Young, 166 W. Va. 309, 273 S.E.2d 592.
51. Id.; see also State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App. 689, 688 P.2d 538 (1984) (child hearsay
statement made in response to leading questions held inadmissible).
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/7
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the name of the person who shot her. 2 After the woman's death,
her ex-husband was convicted of murder and on appeal he contended that the statement made by his ex-wife to the store owner
should not be admitted under the excited utterance exception be53
cause the statement was made calmly and in response to questions.
In upholding the admission of the statement, the court reasoned
that "[t]he fact that the statement was in response to questions
...is not fatal to its admissibility . . . . 54 The court buttressed
its position by quoting language from a New York case 55 which
stated, "if the question propounded or the identity of the questioner may suggest or influence the response or if it is asked an
appreciable length of time after the startling event, the declarations
might very well lack the inherent reliability basic to the rule.' '56
Thus, although the declarant in Young was a woman as opposed
to a child, the third requirement appears to be fundamentally consistent with prior West Virginia law. However, it is probable that
when the declarant is a child the court will support a liberal ap57
plication of the proposed rule.
To satisfy the fourth requirement of the proposed child exception, the court must determine that "the person who heard or took
the hearsay statement of the child is present in court and is available for examination or cross-examination by any party." '5 8 This
section marks a departure from present law in that it is not now
required that such person be present in court and available for
examination or cross-examination.5 9 The most pronounced effect

52. Young, 166 W. Va. at 312-13, 273 S.E.2d at 596.
53. Id. at 314, 273 S.E.2d at 597.
54. Id. at 320, 273 S.E.2d at 600.
55. People v. Edwards, 47 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 392 N.E.2d 1229, 1232, 419 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48
(1975) (case dealing with exclusion of hearsay statement made in response to a question).
56. Young, 166 W. Va. at 321, 273 S.E.2d at 600.
57. This proposition is grounded in the fact that the drafters of the proposed rule intended
it to be a vehicle by which statements that were spontaneous, but which did not rise to the level
of an excited utterance could be admitted into evidence. Interview with Franklin D. Cleckley,
Original Reporter of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and Member of the Ad-hoc Committee
which drafted the Proposed Child Hearsay Exception (Aug. 28, 1987).
58. See supra note 5. It is important to note that should the person to whom the statement
was made or the person by whom the statement was taken die, the rule becomes inapplicable.
59. See Swiger, 336 S.E.2d 541 (statement was revealed by doctor, but there was no indication
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of the rule is that it operates to prevent the admission of multiple
hearsay statements into evidence. 60 This segment of the rule provides for the defendant's right to confrontation 6' and ultimately
was designed to ensure the constitutionality of the proposed rule. 62
The fifth determination to be made by the court is that "the
proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse party his
intention to offer the statement and the copy of the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.''63 This
requirement has never before been imposed in the areas of excited
utterance hearsay exceptions. 64 However, this notice requirement
was adopted from the residual hearsay exception. 65 With regard to
the residual exception, "courts generally have been willing to dispense with notice if the need for the hearsay arises on the eve of
trial or in the course of trial when possible injustice is avoided by
the offer of a continuance or other circumstances. ' 66 There is no
indication as to whether this trend will continue in the area of child
hearsay statements.
The final determination to be made by the court is that "except
for the death of the child, the child is available for examination
or cross-examination by the parties in such a manner as the court
may direct." 67 This requirement stands in sharp contrast to present
West Virginia law wherein no such requirement exists.6 1 In addition, the rule states that he may be examined by close circuit telthat he was required to be available before statement could be admitted); see also Withrow, 142
W. Va. 522, 96 S.E.2d 913. Although the hearsay statement in each case was testified to at trial
by one with whom the child spoke, there is no mention of a requirement that such person had to
be present and available.
60. See W. VA. R. Evm. 805.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. VI & W. VA. CoNsr. art. III,§ 14.
62. Interview with Franklin D. Cleckley, Original Reporter of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence and Member of the Ad-hoc Committee which drafted the Proposed Child Hearsay Exception (Aug. 28, 1987).
63. See supra note 5.
64. See W. VA. R. Evm. 803(2).
65. See W. VA. R. Evwo. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
66. C. MCCOMUCK, McCoRacK ON EVIDENCE, § 324.1 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
67. See supra note 5.
68. See Swiger, 336 S.E.2d 541; Withrow, 142 W. Va. 522, 96 S.E.2d 913; Coram, 116 W.
Va. 492, 182 S.E. 83.
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evision or by testimony videotaped outside of the courtroom. The
rule also provides that:
[i]f the court finds that placing the child and one or more of the parties in the
same room during the testimony of the child would present a substantial risk
of trauma to the child which would substantially impair the ability of the child
to testify, the court may order that the defendant be situated in such a way
that, except as may be necessary for purposes of identification, the child cannot
hear or see the defendant.6 9

Depending upon how it is applied, the constitutional validity of
this provision may be tenuous in light of United States v. Benfield.70 In Benfield, a case involving the videotaped deposition of
an adult woman, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
where the defendant was not allowed to be an active participant
in the videotaped deposition, and where he could neither hear, nor
view the testimony, his sixth amendment right to confrontation was
violated. 71 The court in Benfield emphasized that, "[t]he right of
cross-examination reinforces the importance of physical confrontation ....

This feature is a part of the sixth amendment right

additional to the right of cold, logical cross-examination by one's
counsel." '7 2 Although the United States Supreme Court has on occasion indicated that it views "physical confrontation as an element
of the sixth amendment guarantees," 73 it has likewise acknowledged
that "an adequate opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy
the [confrontation] clause even in the absence of physical confrontation."74 Therefore, it is not constitutionally impermissible for
the child witness to testify without being able to hear or see the
defendant. However, in order to afford the defendant's sixth
amendment right adequate protection, the foregoing provision
should be applied in such a manner as to ensure that the defendant
can at all times both see and hear the child witness.
69. See supra note 5.
70. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
71. Id. at 820-21. Accord Herbert, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850. Contra State
v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984).
72. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 821.
73. Id. at 819 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), Kirby v. United States,
174 U.S. 47 (1899)). See also Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987).
74. Kansas City v. McCoy, 525 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Mo. 1975) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)). See also State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654 (1982).
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In short, the proposed child hearsay exception requires the trial
judge to make a number of determinations before admitting a child's
hearsay statement into evidence. Although not required by present
law, these determinations are not inconsistent with West Virginia
precedent. Should the proposed rule be adopted, the end result
would be an expansion, not an eradication, of current West Virginia law.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED CHILD HEARSAY
EXCEPTION

As was noted earlier, a hearsay statement 75 may not be admitted
under WVRE 804(b) unless the condition precedent of unavailability has been satisfied under WVRE 804(a). 76 Consequently, the
proposed child hearsay exception includes two amendments to
WVRE 804(a) which provide additional means by which a child
77
may be declared unavailable as a witness in sexual abuse cases.
This article will now focus on the constitutionality of these proposed provisions.
A. Effect of the Confrontation Clause Upon the Admissibility
of Hearsay Statements
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
.. to be confronted with the witnesses against him." 7 If construed literally, the confrontation clause would render all hearsay
statements inadmissible. 79 In rejecting such a construction, the
United States Supreme Court has emphasized that:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent
depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used against the prisoner in lieu

75. W. VA. R. Evm. 801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."
76. W. VA. R. EVID. 804.
77. See supra note 5.

78. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The confrontation clause was made applicable to the states in
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Art. III, § 14 of the West Virginia Constitution contains
a provision similar to the confrontation clause.
79. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56, 63.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/7
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of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the
accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the
stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief.80

The right of cross-examination is therefore a primary interest
protected by the confrontation clause."' In contrast, the hearsay
rule seeks to prevent the admission of the extra-judicial statements
into evidence when they are offered to "prove the truth of the
matter asserted.''82 Therefore, while the confrontation clause and
hearsay rule protect similar interests, they are by no means coextensive.83 This is illustrated by the fact that the confrontation
clause may be violated where a statement is admitted under a recognized hearsay exception. 84 Conversely, where evidence is erroneously admitted under a hearsay exception, a 85violation of the
confrontation clause does not necessarily follow.
In California v. Green,86 the Supreme Court was faced with a
situation where prior inconsistent statements made at a preliminary
hearing by a declarant, who was not subject to extensive crossexamination at that hearing, were admitted into evidence. 87 In rejecting the defendant's contention that his right of confrontation
had been denied because he was unable to cross-examine the witness
at the time the prior statement was made, 88 the Supreme Court
held that the confrontation clause does not require the exclusion
of hearsay statements where the declarant is subject to "full and
effective cross-examination at the time of trial.''89 It logically follows that, under certain circumstances, where the declarant does
not testify at trial or where he does testify, but is not subject to

80. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2662 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43).
81. Stincer, 107 S.Ct. at 2662.
82. W. VCA.R. EVID. 801(c).
83. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970).
84. Id. at 155-56.
85. Id. at 156.
86. Id.at 149.
87. Id. at 151-52.
88. Id. at 161.
89. Id. at 159.
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full and effective cross-examination, the confrontation clause may
require the exclusion of hearsay statements. 90
Although a precise formula for determining the validity of all
hearsay exceptions has not been developed, 91 the Supreme Court
in Ohio v. Roberts92 set forth the requirement under the confrontation clause for admitting a hearsay statement where the "declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial." ' 93 The
94
confrontation clause requires (1) a showing by a preponderance
of the evidence that the declarant is unavailable 95 and (2) that the
statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability." 96 The Court went
on to add that, "[r]eliability can be inferred ... where the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."97
In applying the second part of the Roberts test to the proposed
child exception, 98 it is apparent that the requirement for a showing
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness99 has been incorporated into proposed rule 804(b)(6)(a-f). 00 Once the court makes
the determinations required by the proposed rule, the second prong
of the Roberts test has been satisfied. Therefore, proposed rule
804(b)(6)(a-f) complies with the constitutional requirement of the
confrontation clause and is not unconstitutional per se. However,

90. Id.
91. Id. at 162.
92. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56.
93. Id. at 66.
94. Under W. VA. R. Evm. 804(a) the unavailability of the declarant is a preliminary question
to be determined by the court under W. VA. R. Evm. 104(a). In Bourjaily v. United States, 107
S. Ct. 2775 (1987), the Supreme Court held that under FED. R. EvID. 104(a) "when... preliminary
facts ... are disputed, the offering party must prove them by a preponderance of the evidence."
Id. at 2779.
95. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Since child hearsay exceptions are not "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions, it can be
logically inferred that "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" must be shown.
99. For an example of what types of circumstances are deemed to provide "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness," see United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
100. See supra notes 36-69 and accompanying text.
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a condition precedent to the foregoing analysis is that the requirement of unavailability be satisfied.
B.

Unavailability and the Proposed Child Hearsay Exception

When a declarant cannot be present at trial for cross-examination, his hearsay statement cannot be admitted into evidence unless he is shown to be unavailable. 1 1 The proposed child hearsay
exception contains two provisions under which a child may be declared unavailable - 804(a)(6) and 804(a)(7). 0 2
Proposed rule 804(a)(6) generally provides that "a child under
the age of twelve who made a hearsay statement describing an act
of sexual conduct or physical violence... "103 is unavailable. Under this rule, a judge is to make his determination of unavailability
based upon (1) the age of the declarant and (2) the content of the
hearsay statement. 0 4 Thus, this rule affords the trial judge little
discretion in making his determination of unavailability.
Although case law on this point is virtually nonexistent, there
are striking parallels between the above rule and the statute examined by the Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper v. Superior
Court.15 In Globe, a Massachusetts statute requiring"the exclusion
of the press and public during the testimony of a minor victim in
a sex-offense trial' 1 0 6 was held unconstitutional. In focusing its
analysis of the "mandatory closure rule" 0 7 on the first amendment,
the Court indicated that "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor'' °0 is a compelling state interest, but
that it "does not justify a mandatory closure rule.''109 Instead the
Court posited that "[a] trial court can determine on a case-by-case
basis whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
See supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Globe Newspaper v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
Id.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 607-08.
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victim." 110 The Court went on to list factors to be considered in
making such a determination. Included among them are "the minor
victim's age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature
of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests of parents
and relatives."' The Court then contrasted this approach with that
of the statute stating that the statute "requires closure even if the
victim does not seek the exclusion of the press and general public,
and would not suffer injury by their presence."" 2
In light of the analysis in Globe, the flaws present in proposed
rule 804(a)(6) are readily discernible in that the rule does not afford
the trial judge discretion to consider factors other than those set
forth in the rule, such as the child's "psychological maturity and
understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim,
[or] the interests of parents and relatives""' in making his determination of unavailability. Instead the rule makes a finding of
unavailability mandatory where a child declarant "under the age
of twelve ' '" 4 makes a "hearsay statement describing an act of sexual conduct or physical violence."" 5 Thus, like the statute in Globe
which required that the public and the press be excluded from trial
testimony where a minor testified regarding a sexual offense, the
proposed rule makes a finding of unavailability mandatory when
the above two requirements are satisfied. Given the striking similarity between the subject matter and structure of the proposed
rule and the Globe statute, it can be reasonably concluded that the
constitutional vitality of proposed rule 804(a)(6) is at the very least
questionable." 6
The second unavailability provision of the proposed exception
is 804(a)(7), which provides for the unavailability of "a child be110. Id. at 608.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.

114. See supra note 5.
115. Id.
116. Aside from its questionable constitutional status, the proposed rule also appears to be
inconsistent with the underlying rationale of W. VA. R. EVID. 601, which provides that, "[e]very
person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided for by statute or these rules."

This rule was aimed at eliminating the presumption against competency for certain categories of
witnesses (i.e., for those under 14 years of age). See F.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/7
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tween the ages of twelve and sixteen who made a hearsay statement
describing an act of sexual conduct or physical violence ... for
whom the court finds there is a substantial likelihood that the child
will suffer severe emotional or psychological distress if required to
testify in open court.' 1 17 This provision affords the trial judge considerably more discretion than does 804(a)(6) in that it requires the
judge to make a finding that "there is a substantial likelihood that
the child will suffer severe emotional or psychological distress
,,118 Such a finding necessarily requires the trial judge to con...
sider the attending circumstances' 19 of the act either directly or
indirectly via the testimony of an expert witness. However, the trial
judge's discretion under this provision is limited because the provision itself extends only to children between the ages of twelve
and sixteen. 120
Although 804(a)(7) seems to comport with the holding of Globe,
the provision presupposes that severe emotional or psychological
distress constitutes unavailability for confrontation purposes. Although case law in this area is sparse, the California Supreme Court
dealt with a similar issue in People v. Stritzinger.'2' In Stritzinger,
a case in which a stepfather performed various acts of child molestation on his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter, 22 the court was
faced with the issue of whether the victim's mother's testimony
regarding "her daughter's mental health is legally insufficient to
support a finding of witness unavailability."' ' 23 The mother of the
victim testified that her daughter suffered from emotional difficulties, experienced hallucinations, and was hospitalized after intentionally cutting herself. 24 The court held that such testimony
was insufficient to render the victim unavailable as a witness under

117. See supra note 5.
118. Id.
119. Included among such attending circumstances are the child's "psychological maturity and
understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests of parents and

relatives." Globe, 457 U.S. at 608.
120. See supra note 5.
121.
122.
123.
124.

People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1983).
Id. at 509, 668 P.2d at 741, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
Id. at 516, 668 P.2d at 746, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
Id.
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the metal illness or infirmity provision of the Evidence Code.' 25
The court emphasized that the determination that a witness is unable to testify because of mental illness or infirmity "generally calls
for expert opinion, with supporting reasons, as to the likely effect
of the court appearance on the physical or mental health of the
witness.'"126

Although the constitutionality of a provision such as 804(a)(7)
has not been ruled upon, a great deal can be surmised regarding
the manner in which such a provision should be applied if it is to
pass constitutional muster. Viewing 804(a)(7) in light of the reasoning in Stritzinger, a finding of a substantial likelihood of severe
emotional or psychological distress in most cases should be supported by expert testimony' 27 proffered by the proponent of the
child hearsay statement. A preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to support such a finding. 28 In addition, an expert should
have equal access to the child for the purpose of conducting an
examination of the child on behalf of the defendant in order to
satisfy the defendant's due process rights.' 29
In sum, the constitutionality of proposed rule 804(a)(6) is tenuous in light of the holding in Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court.
In contrast, 804(a)(7) may well survive constitutional scrutiny if it
is applied in the above manner.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Mindful of the difficulties encountered in prosecuting child sexual abuse cases, the drafters of West Virginia's Proposed Child
Hearsay Exception sought to protect child witnesses and to preserve
the defendant's right to confrontation as well.' 30 Although at first
125. Id. A similar provision is contained in W. VA. R. EVID. 804(a)(4).
126. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d at 518, 668 P.2d at 747, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
127. Id.
128. Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2777.
129. Special problems arise in cases involving indigent defendants who do not have adequate
funds to employ an independent expert. On this point see State ex rel. Foster v. Luff, 164 W. Va.
413, 264 S.E.2d 477 (1980).
130. REPORT TO TE WEST VIRGINIA STATE BAR BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF nm AD Hoc ComMIrrEE TO CONSIDER PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULEs OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE TEs-

TIMONY OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT MATTERS, 2 (1986) (available at the Office of the
West Virginia Law Review).
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glance the proposed exception appears to be one which will benefit
prosecutorial forces, upon closer examination of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, this initial reaction proves faulty. For
proposed rule 804(b)(6) would require the trial judge to make a
number of determinations before a child hearsay statement could
be admitted into evidence. Such determinations were not required
under the res gestae exception. 131 The introduction of these factors
into hearsay analysis will provide the defendant with additional
means by which he may prevent the introduction of child hearsay
statements. Thus, the defendant is the favored party under the proposed rule.
Although the defendant's preferred status under the rule may
not be looked upon as beneficial, it is in the area of unavailability
that the harshest criticism of the proposed rule can be leveled.
Given the constitutional vulnerability of 804(a)(6) 132 and the age
restrictions present in 804(a)(7),131 the unavailability provisions of
the proposed rule are replete with problems. Perhaps, a partial
solution would be achieved by eliminating proposed provision
804(a)(6) in favor of broadening proposed provision 804(a)(7) to
include children up to the age of sixteen. If such a change were
to be effected, proposed rule 804(a)(7) would (1) establish appropriate guidelines in terms of the declarant's age and (2) provide
the trial judge with the means by which he could, in his discretion,
consider the factors enumerated in Globe in making his determination of unavailability. Under this approach, the trial judge could
determine the unavailability of the declarant on a case-by-case basis
in conformity with constitutional requirements.
In the final analysis, West Virginia's Proposed Child Hearsay
Exception represents an effort to balance the needs of child witnesses against the constitutional protection afforded to the criminal
defendant. Whether this delicate balance has been achieved largely
depends on how the proposed exception is applied in individual

131. See supra notes 6-74 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
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cases. Although the child exception is by no means free of flaws,
31 4
it is certainly worthy of experimentation.
Tamara J. DeFazio

134. At the time of this article's printing, the West Virginia Supreme Court handed down its
decision in State v. Jones, No. 17374 (W. Va. Oct. 22, 1987), a case in which the Court held that
a child's hearsay statement regarding an incident of sexual abuse was inadmissible under the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Id. slip op. at 7. In Jones, the child sexual abuse victim
was a witness at trial, but "refused to testify in any detail about the sexual assault beyond acknowledging that the sexual contact had occurred." Id. slip op. at 5. "The trial court permitted
Trooper Butler to testify about a conversation he had with Rachel Jones [the victim and daughter
of the defendant] six months after the alleged abuse and to explain by gestures what the child had
told him." Id. slip op. at 5. In holding the statement inadmissible, the Court emphasized that
"[u]sually, the length of time between the occurrence and the victim's statement decides whether
the statement is admissible as evidence." Id. slip op. at 7. In addition, after examining the underlying rationale of the the excited utterance exception, the Court concluded that the statement
was inadmissible since the child victim "spoke to Trooper Butler six months after the alleged
molestation took place and after having discussed the matter with both her grandmother and a
case worker." Id. slip op. at 7.
The factual circumstances present in the Jones case are typical of those envisioned by the
drafters of the proposed rule as being appropriate for its application. See supra note 57.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/7
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